The Phased Pattern of Assistance

Because the restrictive governmental actions took place in the five phases previously described, the role of the ASEAO program varied somewhat depending upon which phase one looks at.

Phase 1: The Round-Up of Enemy Aliens

Within hours of the news from Pearl Harbor, the FBI was conducting raids on both coasts, rounding up thousands of enemy-aliens who were on the DOJ's various "watch lists." Strictly speaking, the round-up never came to a formal end, although the bulk of the round-up activity happened in the first few months of the war. Typically, the custodial detentions under the CDP procedures did not involve entire families, as was the case with the internments of the Japanese under the WRA-run program. Thus, rather immediately, there was the problem of income support for the families left behind when a breadwinner was detained. In the Case Studies section (Chapter IV) examples are provided of cases of this type.

Phase 2: The "Voluntary" Relocations-

During the brief window of opportunity that was open from January 29, 1942 until March 29, 1942 relocation from the west coast was self-initiated. Relatively few people voluntarily relocated (about 5,000 Japanese, 10,000 Italians and an uncertain number of Germans), but those who did were potentially eligible for relocation/resettlement assistance.

Also during this initial period the Army opened the first Wartime Civil Control Administration offices in California and ASEAO-funded social workers staffed these offices along with WCCA officials. The social work staff conducted interviews with over 11,000 people during the voluntary relocation phase. Most of these interviews involved persons seeking information about the exclusion process and procedures. An SSB report on this early period indicated that 4,982 cases received "information only" during this phase. ⁽¹⁾ This task--serving as a helpful, non-adversarial source of information about the governmental policies and plans--was a significant service provided by ASEAO-funded caseworkers in this first phase when matters were so unsettled and fear and uncertainty were major burdens under which the residents on the west coast labored.

The ASEAO-funded social workers also provided financial assistance, emergency medical care, and related aid, when needed, for those voluntarily relocating. The direct cash assistance provided in this phase was small, as 1,049 persons received a total of $29,143 in aid. ⁽²⁾

Also, the Social Security Board's Bureau of Employment Security, through the existing network of state employment services offices, provided job placement services for employable persons relocating to new areas who were in need of jobs. The SSB indicated that it provided "major services" to 594 cases during this initial phase. ⁽³⁾

Phase 3: Removal of Persons of Japanese Ancestry-

The forced removal phase began immediately after General DeWitt's second proclamation announcing the forced removals of remaining Japanese from the west coast, and culminated on August 31, 1942, when by then the west coast had been emptied of Japanese (except for a handful in institutional care). By this time, there were 171 WCCA offices spread among the four affected states (California, Oregon, Washington and Arizona) and social workers were placed in each office to handle the social welfare aspects of the operation.

The services provided through the ASEAO program in this phase were basically the same as those during Phases 1 & 2, although on an immensely larger scale. The first task was to quickly beef up the social worker staffing in the offices. Thirty-five extra social workers had been hired for Phases 1 and 2; for Phase 3 almost 400 new social workers were recruited, trained and placed in the WCCA facilities. The recruitment was done by the various state welfare agencies, the salaries were paid from WCCA funds, and the training and on-site supervision was provided by regional officials from the BPA.

Even more important than the practical task of staff recruitment, was the federal role in promulgating uniform federal standards under which the social workers operated. The BPA not only issued regulations and procedural instructions, the federal officials also signed formal memoranda of understanding with the state/local welfare jurisdictions, which became the legal basis on which the federal government was able to ensure compliance on the part of unwilling or reluctant local agencies.

In addition, the Federal Security Agency provided, through its Public Health Service component, medical personnel to provide health examinations and inoculations to the evacuees as part of the interview process. Any evacuee found to be in need of serious medical care was provided such care, including hospitalization if necessary.

The public assistance staffs did interviews with every evacuee family, to ascertain their health and financial status in order to assess their eligibility and need for assistance. During this phase, these staffs interviewed 29,495 Japanese families, containing 108,412 persons, of whom about two-thirds were citizens. Financial assistance was made available to 1,113 families, in the aggregate amount of $14,018 from ASEAO funds, and another 281 families received $4,705 in assistance from WCCA funds. ⁽⁴⁾

Phases 4 & 5: The Internments and The Resettlements-

These phases began as soon as the first evacuees were evacuated from their homes, and they lasted until late 1946 when the last internees were resettled.

During these phases the primary types of assistance provided were ongoing welfare payments to the families of interned individuals, and resettlement assistance to those who left the Relocation Centers or the INS custodial detention. During internment or detention, the responsibility for the financial needs and social welfare of the internees was entirely in the hands of the custodial authority--whether the WRA, the Army or the INS. But persons began leaving the centers almost as soon as they opened and these departures were a steady phenomenon throughout the war, although with some dramatic peaks in mid to late 1945.

One of the most delicate problems during the internment phase was the thorny question of whether families wanted to be reunited with their interned family member. This dilemma involved INS internees mainly, since in the case of the Japanese under the control of the WRA whole families were already interned together. So the problem of family-reunification was most often a problem for German and Italian families, although some Japanese were in this circumstance as well. Benefits for the families who were still in the community likewise at first only involved the INS or Army internees. Indeed, the largest cohort of recipients of aid in the 1942-43 period were the dependents of interned German Americans held in INS custody. In January 1944, there were 493 persons receiving ASEAO payments, more than two-thirds of whom were INS-related cases and only 28% were WRA-related cases. ⁽⁵⁾

In one of those strange civilities of war, resident aliens who were German or Italian citizens were represented diplomatically by the Swiss Legation (Japanese nationals were represented diplomatically by Spain) and the German government established a fund to assist needy German citizens who wished to repatriate to Germany. Such cases were referred by ASEAO interviewers to the Swiss Legation for assistance. Germans being aided by the German government were not eligible for aid from the ASEAO program. However, those Germans that the Reich refused to recognize as citizens, i.e., German Jews, were not eligible for the support from the German government and hence were eligible for aid from the ASEAO program. ⁽⁶⁾

As the war progressed, and more and more Japanese were released from the relocation camps, the resettlement was often achieved by a process in which some member(s) of an interned family left and set up a household, bringing the remaining members along when the household was stable and some means of self-support had been secured. This resettlement often took the form of an adult child of working age leaving the parents and younger siblings behind, but also it frequently involved either the husband or the wife going ahead first, with or without the children. Consequently, resettlement aid was soon flowing to Japanese families from the WRA camps as well as the smaller cohort from the INS and Army camps. Indeed, by September 1944 the proportions of the recipient population had already changed noticeably, with 45% of the cases being from the WRA cohort and 53% from the INS internees. ⁽⁷⁾

During fiscal year 1944 the total amount of benefits paid out under ASEAO provisions was $104,277, with the monthly expenditures ranging from a low of $7,701 in July 1943 to a high of $11,722 in June 1944. The average monthly caseload was 152 during this period, yielding an average monthly payment per family of about $57.20. ⁽⁸⁾

During the spring of 1943 the WRA made a concerted push to encourage families to leave the relocation centers. WRA officials stimulated resettlement by asking each adult internee to complete a questionnaire to assess their "loyalty." If they passed the "test," they were essentially free to leave. By September 1943, 15,000 internees had passed the loyalty test and had been relocated (to areas outside the exclusion zones, which were still closed). ⁽⁹⁾

The loyalty questionnaire focused on two questions, one of which, Question #28, has become notorious, being viewed by many as insulting given the circumstances. Question #28 asked: "do you foreswear allegiance to the Empire of Japan?" Essentially, all an internee had to do was say "yes," and they were free to go. Of the 74,703 individuals asked the question, 68,018 answered "yes" and 5,376 answered "no," the remainder gave qualified answers or did not answer.

Although the loyalty question seems straightforward, we should keep in mind the unique "double-bind" in which Japanese aliens found themselves during this period. Under the provisions of the Nationalization Act of 1790 citizens of Japan were barred from becoming naturalized U.S. citizens. ⁽¹⁰⁾ It was only the second-generation immigrants (the Nisei) who were citizens, by virtue of having been born in the U.S. Thus, asking first-generation immigrants (the Issei) to, in effect, renounce their citizenship with Japan placed them in a kind of "limbo" in which they would be stateless persons. It is plausible to speculate that some Japanese who refused to sign the loyalty oaths did so because of a reluctance to be placed in this anomalous position, or perhaps out of resentment at being placed in this position, rather than out of some presumed "disloyalty" to the U.S.

At the start of 1944, resettlement of whole families had become a central concern of the WRA. Up to that point, most of the 15,000 persons released from the centers had been single individuals who were able to leave the centers and become self-supporting. In January 1944, the Director of the WRA, Dillon S. Myer, wrote to Social Security Board Chairman Arthur Altmeyer to sum up where matters stood, and what he wanted the Board to do to further resettlement.

As you are undoubtedly aware, the purpose of the War Relocation Authority is to relocate as many persons and families now living in our relocation centers as possible at the earliest possible time. There will be no forced movement out of the centers but as plans can be developed which are mutually agreeable to the individuals and families and the War Relocation Authority, persons will again take their appropriate places in new communities and again have an opportunity to contribute their part to their own security and the economic structure of the country.

Myer then outlined his expectations for the role the Board would have to play in the massive resettlement phase:

For sometime the War Relocation Authority has considered the need to develop plans by which whole families could leave centers . . . . In some instances families no longer have sufficient resources to make the move and adjustment themselves . . . The War Relocation Authority would like to request the Social Security Board to give consideration to the following proposal: that you give assistance or service through the state agencies to persons or families who cannot make their own plans and that you give such assistance and service for as long as resources of your program are available . . . Such assistance or service might be necessary in the case of illness, lack of sufficient resources or other situations involving social and family problems. It is desirable that such assistance and service be made available to this group as it is to other members of the community and other persons falling under the Enemy Alien Assistance program. ⁽¹¹⁾

In furtherance of the resettlement process, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes issued a press release in December 1944, after the pending lifting of the exclusion orders had been announced by the Department of the Army. In his press release Ickes expressed the general policy that the WRA would strive to help internees settle throughout the country, but that it would enforce their rights to return to their original homes on the west coast if they so desired. He also promised, ". . . the War Relocation Authority will now work toward an early liquidation of the relocation centers . . . Funds have been provided to the Federal Security Agency for public assistance through state and local welfare agencies for those evacuees who are incapable of self-support." ⁽¹²⁾

Thus resettlement assistance was a major function of the ASEAO program from the Spring of 1943 until long after the end of the war. From a policy point of view, the provision of aid in the resettlement process was different in certain respects than ASEAO provision of welfare assistance to settled families. ASEAO assistance to settled families was modeled on the existing state welfare programs--both the categorical entitlements like the Aid to Dependent Children program, and to the general assistance programs in the various states. Thus the kinds of expenses that were reimbursable were generally in line with those familiar in these pre-existing programs. Since state welfare programs did not pay welfare benefits to someone not residing in their jurisdiction, the concept of aiding a family to move and resettle somewhere else was completely outside the paradigm of the state programs. As a result, some jurisdictions interpreted the resettlement phase of the ASEAO program in a very stingy way and in September 1944 the BPA had to issue nationwide instructions mandating a more generous approach and authorizing states to expend federal funds for such unusual items as moving expenses, transportation of household goods, the purchase of furniture and household supplies, etc.

As a result of the growing exodus from the camps, and the federal government's liberal instructions to the states, the number of cases and the volume of aid swelled throughout late 1944 and into mid-1946. Table 4 reports the number of cases helped either with cash or in-kind assistance and those provided only with services. Table 4 reveals both the overall volume and the pattern of ebb and flow of these caseloads. The peak period was in late 1945 and early 1946, as the massive resettlements were completed. In December 1945, for example, 776 cases were receiving services only and 1,668 cases involved payment of cash or in-kind assistance.

The west coast resistance, and the desire to find new homes for internees even before the restrictions on west coast return were lifted, are the reasons the WRA sought to assist internees in relocating throughout the U.S., creating a kind of Japanese diaspora, that had the unplanned effect of assimilating Japanese-Americans more widely into the fabric of American society. In any case, only about half of the west coast evacuees returned to the west coast after the end of internment, the rest took up residence throughout the nation. ⁽¹⁴⁾ This ending of the west coast racial-enclave pattern of settlement among the Japanese in the United States was probably in their long-run best interests, and is one of the ironic unintended consequences of the relocations and internments.

1. Social Security Bulletin, October 1942, Table 1: 27.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Social Security Bulletin, Vol. V, No. 10, October 1942, page 29, table 5 and page 30, table 7.

5. Leahy, 1945: 41.

6. War Services Handbook, State of California, Department of Social Welfare, 1943: 10-64. Copy available in National Archives, files of the BPA, State Files of Civilian War Assistance to Enemy Aliens, 1940-1948, Box 2.

7. Leahy, 1945: 41.

8. "Assistance to enemy aliens and other restricted persons: Number of cases receiving service only, number of cases receiving assistance, and amount of assistance payments, February 1942-November 1946," undated report from Bureau of Public Assistance, SSB. Document in National Archives II, BPA Master File of Civilian War Assistance to Enemy Aliens, Box 14. Calculations by the author.

9. See WRA: A Story of Human Conservation, U.S. Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority, 1946, page 199, Table 3.

10. A 1943 court ruling permitted Japanese who had served in the military honorably during World War I or World War II to apply for naturalized citizenship.

11. Letter from D.S. Myer, Director, War Relocation Authority, to Arthur J. Altmeyer, Chairman, Social Security Board, dated January 13, 1944. National Archives II, records of the Bureau of Public Assistance- Master File of Civilian War Assistance to Enemy Aliens, 1940-1948, box 14.

12. "Department of the Interior, Information Service, press release, Monday, December 18, 1944. Statement by Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes." National Archives II, records of the Bureau of Public Assistance- Master File of Civilian War Assistance to Enemy Aliens, 1940-1948, box 14.

13. "Assistance to enemy aliens and other restricted persons: Number of cases receiving service only, number of cases receiving assistance, and amount of assistance payments, February 1942-November 1946," undated internal report by the Bureau of Public Assistance, National Archives II, records of the Bureau of Public Assistance- Master File of Civilian War Assistance to Enemy Aliens, 1940-1948, box 14.

14. WRA: A Story of Human Conservation, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946): Table 6, pages 203-210. (The summary totals, broken out by west coast resettlement and other locations, is also shown in Table 2 on page 6.)