It is fair to say that Roosevelt would use this Emergency Fund in all manner of creative ways, many of which were probably never conceived by the Congress. Certainly, in April 1941 no one in Congress could have conceived of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent mass relocation and internment of the Japanese living in the U.S. But Roosevelt was quick to seize the broad delegation of authority under the Emergency Fund legislation--and especially the available pot of money--to create the ASEAO program.

The immediate impetus for the President's action seems to have come from Attorney General Francis Biddle. Biddle was one of the voices within the Administration opposing the mass relocations and internments, along with Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes. Biddle and Ickes would, ironically, both have major responsibilities for carrying-out the programs they opposed.

In any event, on January 31, 1942--after the DOJ-mandated relocations of from the west coast had been ordered--Biddle wrote the Administrator of the FSA, Paul McNutt, expressing his concern for the families affected by the government's actions and suggesting that the FSA find a way to provide some type of social welfare benefits to them. He told McNutt: ". . . resettlement involves processes which are basically associated with the social services, including the investigation of the needs and means of the aliens affected, helping them to obtain appropriate employment, and otherwise assisting those who are not able to resettle and reestablish themselves in other locations. . . ." ⁽⁴⁾

Biddle's interest apparently led to the issuance of a letter from President Roosevelt to the Secretary of the Treasury, authorizing him to expend money from the Emergency Fund for what would become the ASEAO program. On February 6, 1942, the President sent a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, which authorized the Treasury to expend up to $500,000 ". . . in making provision for the removal of enemy aliens excluded from designated areas . . . and for transportation of their dependents, and for the relocation of and temporary aid to enemy aliens or their dependents who have been removed from such prohibited areas or whose normal means of livelihood has been interrupted by reason of restrictions imposed by the Attorney General." ⁽⁵⁾ The original $500,000 allocation would be augmented by additional funds, so that in total the available funds for benefits under the ASEAO program were about three times the initial allocation.

Explicitly, the language of the February 6th letter refers only to "enemy aliens." Near the end of March--since the scope of the relocations and removals had expanded to include Japanese citizens as well as aliens--the President sent the Treasury Secretary a second authorizing letter permitting extension of the ASEAO program to "persons other than enemy aliens." ⁽⁶⁾

The President's letter to the Secretary of the Treasury authorized the release of the allocated funds, and identified the Federal Security Administration as the responsible agency for administering the new programs. The FSA Administrator in turn delegated responsibility for the proposed programs to the Social Security Board (SSB), headed by Chairman Arthur J. Altmeyer. It was customary practice for the FSA to delegate the actual work, both operational and policymaking, to the Social Security Board for programs within its general areas. Thus, the FSA's only role here was as a "pass-through" agent. In his turn, Altmeyer delegated the programs to the Board's various subsidiary Bureaus.

This letter of February 6th was one two issued by Roosevelt on that day. The other also drew on the Emergency Fund to create two additional war-related programs: one to provide disability, survivors and medical care benefits to civilian defense workers and their families (known as the Civilian War Benefits program), and one to provide assistance with the repatriation of civilians from overseas battle zones (known as Civilian War Assistance). ⁽⁷⁾

The President had created three new benefit programs by executive fiat. The expectation was that Congress would follow the President's order with permanent legislation in at least one of these areas. ⁽⁸⁾ But beyond the bare language of the President's two February 6th letters, there was no real legislative history or other guidance for the SSB to draw upon in crafting actual programs to respond to the President's directive.

One interesting question is whether the Congress showed any signs of opposition to this broad exercise of Presidential power. Whether there was prior consultation with the Congress regarding the President's action is unknown. Suffice it to observe that in major newspapers of the period no mention occurs of any adverse Congressional reaction to the issuance of the President's letters. ⁽⁹⁾ There was heated local and regional complaint regarding the relocations and the internments, to be sure--mostly from local residents who did not want internees in their area. But there was no reported opposition to either the ASEAO program or the two related programs authorized by the President. ⁽¹⁰⁾ President Roosevelt's executive action, and the resulting federal programs, seem to have sailed under the radar of public and Congressional scrutiny.